Churchill’s Phoney War: A Study in Folly and Frustration by Graham T. Clews is a meticulous and thorough study of Winston Churchill’s record and decision-making as First Lord of the Admiralty in the War Cabinet of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain from September 1939 till he himself became prime minister in May 1940. Although this opening stage of the Second World War has been dubbed a Phony War, it was only a phony war on land, not at sea where the Royal Navy was engaged in active and costly operations against the Germans. It was also a period of intense frustration and disappointment for Churchill whose performance, as Clews concludes, was “decidedly mixed.”
The book is divided into two parts, with Part One: Churchill as First Lord considering his role in the U-Boat campaign, Operation Catherine, and the naval construction program, while Part Two: Churchill and the Wider War examines Churchill as a War Cabinet member, including his role in Royal Marine, Narvik and Finland, and the Norwegian Campaign. Clews describes Churchill’s errors, mistakes, and misjudgments, but rejects the caricature of Churchill as “an ardent and independent arbiter of Admiralty policy, routinely rejecting the good advice of his advisers.” The Admiralty was indeed struggling with such matters as the debate on Convoy-offensive patrolling and Churchill often supported the consensus view. Likewise, Clews rejects the argument that attributes all missed opportunities or errors in the Norwegian Campaign as being due to the “unwelcomed interference” of Churchill and First Sea Lord Dudley Pound. He writes, “the culpability of [Churchill and Pound] is likely overstated; their decisions were not unreasonable in the circumstances, and the negative consequences of their input is not as clear as claimed.”
Clews concludes that Churchill on becoming prime minister in May 1940, “continued to be the complicated mix of strengths and failings that he had been during the first nine months of war, but the circumstances now fitted his strengths much more closely. The events of May 1940 meant that he was freed from the frustrating politico-military straitjacket of the Phony war that had confounded him as much as it had his predecessor: his path was clearer, his task was simpler, if much more formidable. The man finally met his moment, and this gave him his finest hour.”
Churchill’s Phoney War is a detailed academic study with somewhat dense writing. It might be a daunting read for the general reader. It is, however, an important, balanced, and much needed comprehensive study of Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty.
The volume is published by the Naval Institute Press as part of the Studies in Naval History and Sea Power series. Clews is also the author of Churchill’s Dilemma: The Real Story Behind the Origins of the 1915 Dardanelles Campaign.